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“Agreements with insurance companies that provide
for payments without regard to actual losses of the
insured, e.g., in the event that certain weather
conditions occur or do not occur, do not constitute
insurance payments for the destruction of or damage
to crops.  Accordingly, payments under such contracts
will not qualify for deferral under section 451(d) of
the Code.”17
The latter provision prevents the proceeds from so-called
“rain insurance” policies from being eligible for deferral.
In light of these authorities, it appears that the proceeds
from crop insurance policies involving revenue assurance
will not be considered eligible for deferral under current law.
An amendment to Section 451(d) of the Internal Revenue
Code will be necessary to make such proceeds eligible for
deferral.  Without such an amendment, revenue assurance is
likely to be less popular than would be the case if the
proceeds were eligible for deferral.
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 13 Harl, Agricultural Law ch. 120A (1996);
Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 13.04[1] (1997).
2 I.R.C. § 451(d).
3 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-4(c).
4 I.R.C. § 451(d).
5 Notice 89-55, 1989-1 C.B. 696.
6 I.R.C. § 451(d).
7 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-6(a)(1).
8 Rev. Rul. 74-145, 1974-1 C.B. 113.
9 Id.
10 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-6(b).
11 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-6(b)(2).
12 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-6(a)(2).
13 See I.R.C. § 451(d).
14 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-6(a).
15 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-6(a)(1).
16 Notice 89-55, 1989-1 C.B. 698.
17 Id.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
  BANKRUPTCY
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ALLOCATION OF TAX PAYMENTS. The debtor
was a part owner of a corporation which had failed to pay
employment taxes. The corporation entered into an
installment payment agreement with the IRS for payment of
the taxes and penalties. As part of that agreement, the debtor
agreed to be liable for the 100 percent penalty as a
responsible person in the corporation. The installment
agreement did not provide for any allocation of the payments
between the tax debt and the penalties and interest on the
debt. The debtor, in the debtor’s case, moved to require the
IRS to retroactively allocate the installment payments first to
the tax debt and then to the penalties and interest. The court
denied the motion for two reasons: (1) the court did not have
any authority to make rulings involving the corporation
because the corporation was not a debtor in this case, and (2)
the court had no authority to make retroactive allocation of
tax payments, especially where the tax payments were not
made with a specific allocation request by the taxpayer. In
re Kaplan, 104 F.3d 589 (3d Cir. 1997).
DISCHARGE. In a Tax Court case involving the
debtor’s 1988 income taxes, the Tax Court held that the
debtor was liable for fraud penalties in connection with the
taxes owed. The debtor then filed for bankruptcy and sought
to avoid the 1988 taxes. The court held that the Tax Court
ruling was to be given collateral estoppel effect in the
bankruptcy case because the Tax Court made a specific
ruling of fraud based on a higher standard of proof;
therefore, the 1988 taxes were nondischargeable under
Section 523(a)(1)(C). In re Mitchell, 97-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,268 (Bankr. C.D. Calif. 1997).
DISMISSAL. When the debtor filed for Chapter 13, the
debtor had not filed income tax returns for 1987 through
1994. The Bankruptcy Court ordered the debtor to file the
income tax returns as a condition for confirmation of the
plan. The debtor filed the returns but put zeros in all lines of
the return. the debtor argued that the IRS had no authority to
tax income or to require income tax returns to be filed. The
Bankruptcy Court dismissed the case for failure to comply
with an order of the court. The District Court ruled that,
because the debtor had clear notice of the court order and
sufficient time to comply, the Bankruptcy court acted
reasonably in dismissing the case for failure of the debtor to
comply with the court-ordered filing of the returns.
Jablonski v. I.R.S., 204 B.R. 456 (W.D. Pa. 1996).
CONTRACTS
NONACCEPTANCE OF GOODS. The defendant, a
landscaping contractor, ordered several types of ornamental
trees from the plaintiff to be sent COD. When the trees
arrived at the defendant’s business, the defendant paid only
the shipping charges, at the acquiescence of the plaintiff.
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After inspecting the trees, the defendant informed the
plaintiff that many of the trees were unacceptable because of
their poor condition and refused to pay for the poor quality
trees. However, the defendant “heeled in” the trees and
watered them for several months before chipping the dead
trees into mulch. The plaintiff argued that the defendant
accepted the trees when the defendant paid for the shipping
costs. The court held that payment of the shipping costs was
not an indication of acceptance because the COD terms
required some payment before delivery would occur and
gave the defendant an opportunity to inspect the trees. The
defendant sought recovery of the labor and other incidental
costs in maintaining the trees during the dispute. The court
awarded  to the defendant the costs of maintaining the trees
to the extent proved by the defendant. Gragg Farms v.
Kelly Green Landscaping, 674 N.E.2d 783 (Ohio Mun.
1996).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
   PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT. The plaintiff sold fresh fruit to a corporation owned
by the defendants. The corporation failed to pay for the fruit
and the plaintiff filed a complaint under PACA and filed an
action in state court for payment for the fruit. The state court
awarded a money judgment to the plaintiff and the plaintiff
dismissed the PACA complaint. The corporation went out of
business and did not pay the judgment. The plaintiff then
filed a complaint against the defendants under PACA. The
defendants argued that the issues involved in the PACA
action were collaterally estopped by the state court action
and the res judicata effect of that judgment, thus limiting the
plaintiff’s recovery to the money judgment against the
corporation.  The court held that the defendants were liable
for the PACA trust established upon the sale of the fruit and
that the defendants’ liability was separate from the
corporation’s liability. The court also ruled that the state
court judgment had no res judicata effect because the
defendants were not parties in that action and the PACA
liability of the defendants was not litigated in that action.
Finally, the court held that the plaintiff’s dismissal of the
PACA action did not preclude the filing of a PACA action
against the defendants. Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Fisher,
104 F.3d 280 (9th Cir. 1997).
TOBACCO. The plaintiff had owned a tobacco farm
since 1970 and had increased the tobacco allotment for the
farm steadily over the years. After a neighboring property
was sold, the county committee discovered that a portion of
the neighboring farm had been included in the aerial photo
of the plaintiff’s farm by mistake. The committee then
reduced the plaintiff’s allotment by the proportion of the
amount of the neighbor’s land erroneously included in the
plaintiff’s land. The committee used the reconstitution
regulations of 7 C.F.R. § 719 as authority for the reduction,
arguing that the removal of the erroneous land from the
plaintiff’s land in the records constituted a transfer of the
land. The court found that the determination of the plaintiff’s
original allotments did not depend on the erroneous
inclusion of the neighboring land; therefore, the discovery of
the error should not have affected the tobacco allotment of
the plaintiff’s land. The court held that the county committee
should have only corrected the aerial photo and left the
allotment unchanged. Copley v. Elliot, 948 F. Supp. 586
(W.D. Va. 1996).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
DISCLAIMERS-ALM § 5.02[6]. * The decedent had
established an irrevocable trust in which the decedent had a
testamentary power to appoint the trust principal to the
decedent’s descendants and their spouses. At the death of the
decedent, the trust property passed to the decedent’s
descendants, but if none survived the decedent, the trust
property passed to the decedent’s brother. The decedent and
brother also established another trust with a portion of the
trust as irrevocable. At the decedent’s death, the decedent’s
share of the trust was to pass to the brother. The decedent
did not exercise the power of appointment over the first
trust. The brother disclaimed any interest in either trust
within nine months after the decedent’s death. The IRS ruled
that the disclaimers were effective and did not result in any
gift tax liability for the brother. Ltr. Rul. 9710025, Dec. 9,
1996.
GROSS ESTATE. The decedent was injured at birth by
the negligence of doctors and hospital staff. The decedent
obtained a negligence judgment against the hospital and the
decedent received a settlement award of money to the
decedent’s parents to be used to support the decedent,
attorney fees, and money which was placed in a court-
supervised trust for the decedent. The trustee was given
discretion to distribute trust principal and interest to the
decedent for the decedent’s health, education, maintenance
and support until the earlier of the decedent’s death or 25
years. The court retained the power to revoke the trust, at
which time the funds were to be paid to the decedent. The
decedent’s estate argued that the trust was not includible in
the decedent’s gross estate because (1) the trustee had
discretion as to whether to distribute trust principal, and (2)
the court retained the power to revoke the trust. The court
held that the decedent had the sole beneficial interest in the
trust because the trustee had the power to control only the
timing. The court also held that the trial court did not have
control over the trust because if the trust was revoked, all of
the trust principal was to be distributed to the decedent.
Therefore, the court held that the date-of-death value of the
trust was included in the decedent’s gross estate. The case is
designated as not for publication. Arrington v. United
States, 97-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,260 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
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IRA. The decedent’s will provided for a pre-residuary
marital trust for the surviving spouse which was to be funded
with the maximum amount of property sufficient to reduce
the estate tax to zero. The will provided for passing of the
residuary estate to a trust for the surviving spouse and
children. The trustee had the discretionary power to
distribute principal and income to the surviving spouse for
support and discretionary power to distribute principal and
income to the children for their support and education. The
surviving spouse had a lifetime and testamentary special
power of appointment over the trust assets.  A portion of the
residuary estate was the decedent’s interest in an IRA. The
surviving spouse disclaimed the power of appointment and
the right to trust income and principal. But the surviving
spouse did not disclaim the right to receive the residuary as
an heir-at-law.  The children also executed disclaimers of
their entire interests in the trust so that the trust assets passed
to the surviving spouse under the trust and will provisions
and intestacy law. The surviving spouse received the trust
corpus as part of the residuary assets, including the
decedent’s IRA assets. The surviving spouse rolled the IRA
funds over to an IRA in the surviving spouse’s name. The
IRS ruled that the IRA would be treated as having passed
directly to the surviving spouse and the spouse would not
include the IRA funds in current income. Ltr. Rul. 9710034,
Dec. 12, 1996.
The decedent owned an interest in an IRA which had the
surviving spouse as the designated beneficiary. The decedent
had been receiving distributions from the IRA and was over
the age of 70 1/2 years at death. After the decedent’s death,
the surviving spouse requested a trustee-to-trustee
distribution from the decedent’s IRA to the spouse’s IRA.
The surviving spouse was also over the age of 70 1/2. The
IRS ruled that (1) the surviving spouse could treat the
decedent’s IRA as her own because the transfer of the funds
constituted an election to treat both IRAs as belonging to the
spouse, (2) the spouse could elect a new beginning date for
the IRA, (3) the spouse could elect whether or not to
recalculate the life expectancy as of the new beginning date,
and (4) no excise tax would be imposed for failure to make
distributions from the decedent’s IRA during the year of the
decedent’s death. Ltr. Rul. 9711032, Dec. 20, 1996..
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* After the
decedent’s death the will was contested by the surviving
spouse and a will settlement was reached for distribution of
the residuary estate between the surviving spouse and a
charitable organization. The IRS argued that the marital and
charitable deductions should be limited to the lesser of the
amount to have been distributed under the will or the actual
amount distributed. The court held that the actual amounts
distributed under the settlement would be allowed as
deductions because the settlement was the result of a bona
fide adversary proceeding involving enforceable rights. The
IRS also argued that the marital and charitable deductions
should be reduced by the amount of administrative expenses,
whether or not the expenses were paid from principal or
income. The court held that the administrative expenses
reduced the deduction only to the extent paid from principal
because, under Georgia law, the estate could pay such
expenses from principal or income as allowed by the will.
The Supreme Court affirmance resolves a conflict between
this case and a contrary holding in Est. of Street v. Comm’r,
974 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1992); Burke v. United States, 994
F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert denied., 114 S. Ct. 546
(1993). Est. of Hubert v. Comm’r, 97-1 U.S Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 60,261 (S. Ct. 1997), aff’g, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 60,209 (11th Cir. 1995), aff’g, 101 T.C. 314
(1993).
The decedent had executed a will in 1973 which
provided for a marital trust for the surviving spouse which
was funded with 50 percent of the estate in order to take
advantage of the maximum marital deduction available at the
time. The will also provided for another trust which had a
spendthrift clause. The marital trust was designated as trust
A and the non-marital trust was designated as trust B. In
1982, the will was amended to provide for $2 million of
assets to pass to the non-marital trust, redesignated as trust
A, and the remainder to pass to the marital trust,
redesignated as trust B, again in order to take advantage of
the unlimited marital deduction and QTIP provisions
available at that time. The marital trust was set up to be
QTIP. However, the amended will unknowingly retained the
spendthrift clause as to trust B, now the marital trust. The
IRS claimed that the will provided for application of the
spendthrift clause against the marital trust, thus limiting the
surviving spouse’s rights to the trust income. In addition, the
IRS claimed that the will allowed the trustee to pay some
expenses from the marital trust. The estate claimed that the
application of the spendthrift and expense provisions was
inadvertently not changed to reflect the change in
designation of the trusts as A and B. The court found that the
will was ambiguous in that the IRS interpretation was
contrary to will provisions devising all the remaining assets
to the marital trust.  Therefore, the court held that the
spendthrift clause and expense payment provisions did not
apply to the marital trust and the entire QTIP trust was
eligible for the marital deduction. Miller v. U.S., 949 F.
Supp. 544 (N.D. Ohio 1996).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BELOW MARKET INTEREST LOANS. The
taxpayer was a corporation owned by a husband and wife.
The shareholders contracted to build two buildings which
were to be leased to the corporation. The funds for the
construction, however, were borrowed from the corporation
as needed. The loans were recorded as such on the
corporation’s books but no interest was paid during the
construction periods. The shareholders did make provisions
for repayment of the loans with interest after completion of
the construction. The taxpayer argued that the loan was not
made until the final payment was made for the construction.
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The court held that, under I.R.C. § 7872, each payment was
considered a separate loan with the amount of interest below
the market interest rate, as determined using the Applicable
Federal Rate tables, as income to the shareholders. The court
rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the lack of interest rate
did not affect the income tax liability of the taxpayer and
shareholders because payment of interest would have
produced offsetting income and deductions. KTA-Tator,
Inc. v. Comm’r, 108 T.C. No. 8 (1997).
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The
taxpayers sued their former employers for sex discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
taxpayers received a settlement award of back and front pay.
The court held that the settlement proceeds were includible
in income because the action did not provide compensation
for tort-type personal injuries. Frederickson v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1997-125; Martinez v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1997-126.
The taxpayer owned several restaurants under a license
from a national corporation. The taxpayer joined with
several other restaurant licensees in a corporation which
owned all of their restaurants in exchange for stock in that
corporation. The national corporation prevented the
restaurant corporation from making a public offering and the
taxpayer sued the national corporation, alleging injury from
emotional distress. The taxpayer reached a settlement
agreement with the national corporation which provided for
the purchase of all of the taxpayer’s stock and release of all
claims by the taxpayer. The IRS argued that the settlement
proceeds were all received in exchange for the stock. The
court found that the settlement agreement specifically
included the release of the emotional distress claim;
therefore, the court held that a portion of the settlement
would be allocated to that claim. The court held that the
portion of the settlement which related to the emotional
distress claim was excludible from income under I.R.C. §
104 as payments received for a personal injury claim. Noel
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-113.
DISASTER AREAS-ALM § 4.05[2].* The IRS has
announced the disaster areas designated by the President for
1996 for purposes of eligibility of taxpayers to qualify for
I.R.C. § 165(i) deferral of claiming losses from those
disasters. Rev. Rul. 97-11, I.R.B. 1997-10, 5.
The President has declared certain areas of South Dakota
as disaster areas from a Nov. 13, 1996 storm. Losses from
these casualties may be deducted in taxpayers’ 1995 returns.
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP COSTS. The IRS
has issued a proposed revenue procedure, Notice 97-7, I.R.B.
1997-1, 8, which would provide guidance for issuing letter
rulings on the tax treatment, under I.R.C. §§ 162 and 263, of
environmental cleanup costs involving a single
environmental cleanup transaction. The proposed procedures
would apply for an experimental period of two years once
the final procedures are issued. The public is invited to
comment on the proposed procedures. The IRS has
announced that taxpayers may request a pre-submission
conference to discuss the procedures for submitting a letter
ruling request if the taxpayer intends to file a request for a
letter ruling. The conference is advisory only and any advice
from the IRS cannot be relied upon under I.R.C. § 7805(b).
Ann. 97-22, I.R.B. 1997-__, __.
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayers, husband and wife,
operated a horse breeding and racing activity. The husband
was employed full-time as an anesthetist and received a
military pension. The wife was not employed and devoted
full-time to the horse activity except when suffering from
injuries or illnesses not related to the activity. The court held
that the taxpayers operated the activity with the intent to
make a profit because (1) the taxpayers operated the activity
in a businesslike manner in using business stationery,
advertising in trade publications and participating in trade
shows; (2) the taxpayers developed a business plan, although
some of the plans were prevented by the wife’s illnesses; (3)
the taxpayers maintained sufficient records for accurate tax
return preparation; (4) the taxpayers attended seminars at
conventions and colleges to learn more about the horse
breeding and racing businesses; (5) the taxpayers expended
significant amounts of time on the activity and did not use
the horses for personal pleasure; (6) the losses incurred were
due to the physical inability of the wife to fully participate in
the business during her illnesses. Phillips v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1997-128.
LETTER RULINGS. The IRS has announced a pilot
program of pre-submission conferences in the National
Office for matters which will be a subject of a letter ruling
request under Rev. Proc. 97-2, I.R.B. 1997-1, 64. Rev. Proc.
97-21, I.R.B. 1997-12.
LEVY. The taxpayer was receiving benefits under social
security which were levied against by the IRS. The taxpayer
argued that the social security benefits were exempt from
levy under 42 U.S.C. § 407(a). The court held that I.R.C. §
6334(c) overrides Section 407(a) and allowed the levy of the
benefits. The court also ruled that the taxpayer’s claim for
damages was not allowed because the IRS had not waived its
governmental immunity from such suits under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. Leininc v. United States, 97-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,254 (D. Conn. 1997).
RETURNS. The IRS has announced that persons living
in declared disaster areas in Arkansas, Kentucky and Ohio
will be allowed extra time to file returns and make payment
due in March. Returns due by March 15, 1997 will be
considered timely filed if filed by April 15, 1997, but interest
must be paid for the time after March 15, 1997. Farmers who
had planned to file returns and to make estimated payments
by March 3, 1997, have until April 15, 1997 to file the
returns and make the payments. Penalties on tax deposits due
from March 3 through March 15, 1997, will not be assessed
if the payments are made by March 31, 1997. The IRS also
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will suspend examination and collection activities in the
disaster area until April 7, 1997. IR 97-12.
The IRS has announced a pilot program for District of
Columbia, Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia and West
Virginia, under which Form 941 Telefile can be used for
filing and payment of employment taxes. IR 97-10.
The IRS has issued guidance for taxpayers who maintain
books and records using an electronic storage system that
either images the hardcopy books and records or transfers
computerized records to optical storage disks. Records
maintained in an electronic storage system in compliance
with the revenue procedure will constitute records under
I.R.C. § 6001. Rev. Proc. 97-22, I.R.B. 1997-__.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.03[2][c].*
PASSIVE INVESTMENT INCOME. The taxpayer was
a corporation which planned to make the Subchapter S
election. The corporation owned several properties, one of
which was a farm. The corporation leased the farm to third
parties and provided services to the tenants. The services,
provided by the corporation’s employees included
maintaining irrigation pumps, mowing, spraying to control
weeds, operating wildlife management areas, and
maintaining bridges and irrigation improvements. The IRS
ruled that the rental income from the farm lease was not
passive investment income for purposes of the Subchapter S
election. Ltr. Rul. 9710014, Dec. 4, 1996.
TRUSTS. All of the stock of an S corporation was owned
by three QSSTs. The corporation redeemed a pro rata
number of shares from each trust, using retained earnings to
fund the redemptions. The corporation declared to the trustee
that the distribution of retained income was a redemption or
call of shares. Under the trust agreements, the trustee had the
authority to allocate the distribution to principal or income,
and the trustee chose to allocate the distributions to
principal. Under state law a distribution made pursuant to a
call of shares was principal to the trusts. The IRS ruled that
the proceeds of the redemption was not fiduciary accounting
income under I.R.C. § 643(b). The IRS also ruled that I.R.C.
§§ 1368(b), (c) applied in determining the extent to which
the distributions were includible in trust income. The IRS
ruled that the distribution did not change the trusts’ status as
QSSTs. Ltr. Rul. 9710026, Dec. 9, 1996.
  SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION EXPENSES.
Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa has introduced Sen. 429
which would amend I.R.C. § 175(a) (soil and water
conservation expenditures) to provide:
“(4) Cash rent landlords.--A taxpayer shall be treated
as engaged in the business of farming with respect to
any land used in farming if such taxpayer rents such
land (regardless of the basis of the rental payment) to
a member of the taxpayer’s family (as defined in
section 2032A(e)(2).”
TRUSTS. The taxpayers owned and operated a high-rise
window washing business and transferred the business to a
trust for no consideration. The business was continued as
before the transfer to the trust. The trustee was the promoter
of the trust package sold to the taxpayers. The trust made
several loans to the taxpayers and the trustee executed a line
of credit to the taxpayers. The taxpayer issued checks to
themselves from the trust’s accounts pursuant to the loans
and line of credit. The taxpayers did not include the business
income in their gross income. The taxpayers claimed to have
paid back the loans but failed to provide any documentary or
other evidence of repayment. The court held that the loans
were not bona fide because, the loans were unsecured, no
credit report or financial statement was required, and the
loans had below market interest rates. The court held that the
amounts distributed as loans were gross income to the
taxpayers.  Maranto v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-122.
NEGLIGENCE
ELECTRICITY. The plaintiff was a dairy farmer and
the defendant was a rural electric, nonprofit cooperative
which supplied the electrical power to the plaintiff’s farm.
The plaintiff detected signs of stray voltage affecting the
dairy cows and had the farm tested for stray voltage.
Although the tests were inconclusive, the effects of stray
voltage continued, even after the plaintiff rewired most of
the dairy buildings. The plaintiff sued in negligence and
nuisance, claiming that the stray voltage came from ground
circuits used by the defendant. The plaintiff claimed to have
lost seven cows and 12 to 15 calves from miscarriages and
claimed that 20 to 40 percent of the cows failed to conceive
calves from the effects of the stray voltage. The trial jury
awarded the plaintiff $573,000 for negligence. The
defendant argued that the jury instructions for the standard
of care was erroneous in that it required the defendant to
exercise the highest degree of care in handling electricity
which is a dangerous product. The court held that the
instruction was improper in that the standard of care for
electricity was ordinary and reasonable care under the
circumstances to prevent injury. The case was remanded for
retrial on this issue. The trial court presented a jury
instruction on the liability of the defendant’s stray voltage as
a private nuisance. The court held that the instruction was
improper in that the electricity was provided in compliance
with statutes and regulations; therefore, the stray voltage
could not be considered a nuisance. Kuper v. Lincoln-
Union Elec. Co., 557 N.W.2d 748 (S.D. 1996).
RIPARIAN RIGHTS
DRAINAGE. The plaintiff owned a farm neighboring
the defendant’s farm. The plaintiff created a channel to drain
surface water to a tile line which had a vertical pipe at its
opening. The plaintiff lowered this pipe to provide access for
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the drain water. However, the defendant restored the drain
opening to the original height and plugged the opening to
prevent any water from entering the tile line. The plugging
of the tile line caused the drained water to back up and flood
the plaintiff’s property. The plaintiff argued that the plaintiff
had a prescriptive easement to use the tile line or that the
plaintiff was entitled to use the drain surface water through
the tile line as a reasonable use. The court held that the
reasonable use doctrine applied here and that the defendant’s
proper remedy was to sue for damages if the plaintiff’s
draining method was unreasonable. The court upheld no
award of damages for the defendant because the defendant
showed no evidence of damage to the tile line, except from
the defendant’s own actions. The defendant was enjoined
from blocking the plaintiff’s use of the tile line. The court
also upheld the damage award to the plaintiff from the
flooding caused by the defendant’s blockage of the tile line.
The court also denied the plaintiff’s claim of prescriptive
easement, holding that the right of natural drainage could not
create an easement. Kral v. Boesch, 557 N.W.2d 597
(Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
PERFECTION. The debtor borrowed money from the
plaintiff and the debtor granted the plaintiff a security
interest in growing crops. The security agreement described
the land on which the crops were growing by legal
description of all of the debtor’s crop land, even though the
debtor did not grow crops on all of the land described. The
plaintiff filed a financing statement but the financing
statement provided a legal description of only some of the
land and the land described was land not planted by the
debtor. The debtor also granted a security interest in the
same crops to a bank and the bank properly perfected that
security interest. The plaintiff argued that the bank was not
misled by the error in the description of the crop land in the
financing statement. The court cited First Nat’l Bank in
Creston v. Francis, 342 N.W.2d 468 (Iowa 1984) in support
of its holding that where the financing statement makes use
of the legal description of the land on which the collateral
crops are to be grown, errors which are more than minor
make the description insufficient to perfect the security
interest. The court held that a completely erroneous
description was insufficient to perfect the plaintiff’s security
interest; therefore the bank had a superior security interest in
the crops. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the
bank was not actually misled by the erroneous description
because the bank had knowledge of where the debtor grew
the crops. The court held that the statute governing the
sufficiency of description of the land, Wis. Stat. § 409.110,
provided no allowance for failure to mislead other creditors.
Smith & Spidahl Enter., Inc. v. Lee, 557 N.W.2d 865
(Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
PRODUCER’S LIEN. The bankruptcy debtor had
purchased processed shelled pecans from a processor of nuts
which also grew pecans at the processor’s orchards. The
processor claimed a secured lien under the California
statutory producer’s lien, Calif. Food & Agric. Code §§
55631-55635, arguing that the pecans sold to the debtor were
produced by the processor. The debtor argued that the
processor was estopped from claiming the lien because the
processor did not inform the debtor that the pecans were
produced in the processor’s orchard. The court held that the
processor was estopped because (1) the processor knew that
at least some of the nuts were grown in the processor’s
orchard, (2) the processor intended that the debtor would act
in accordance with the belief that the nuts were not produced
by the processor, (3) the debtor did not know the true origin
of the nuts, and (4) the debtor relied on the processor’s
failure to tell where the nuts came from. The debtor also
argued that the processor did not qualify for the statutory
producer’s lien because the processor mixed nuts from other
processors with the nuts produced by the processor and the
processor had no proof that the nuts sold to the debtor were
exclusively produced by the processor. The court examined
the records of the processor and found that the records were
inconsistent and inaccurate such that it was impossible to tell
where the nuts came from which were sent to the debtor;
therefore, the processor failed to prove that the nuts came
exclusively from the processor’s orchard and the lien was
not available to the processor. In re S.N.A. Nut Co., 204
B.R. 537 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997).
STATE TAXATION
TIMBERLAND. The taxpayers owned 23 acres of land
on which stood the taxpayers’ residence, outbuildings, a
swimming pool and a tennis court. The taxpayers challenged
the assessment of the whole property, arguing that a hog
confinement operation across the road diminished the value
of the property. The state assessor made a visit to the
taxpayers’ property for about an hour and detected no odor
from the hog operation. The assessor also drove by the hog
operation but again did not detect an odor. The state board of
assessment rejected the decrease in value for odors from the
hog operation, based on the assessor’s visit. The court held
that the short visit by the assessor was insufficient to make a
determination of the extent of the effect of the odor on the
value of the taxpayers’ property and remanded the case to
obtain sufficient evidence of any odor problem. The
taxpayers also argued that the land was eligible for the 80
percent reduction as woodland. The court found that the
property had less than a 50 percent canopy coverage of trees
and did not meet the statutory definition of woodland. In
addition, the court noted that the taxpayers did not harvest
any timber from the land. Corey v. State Bd. of Tax
Commissioners, 674 N.E.2d 1062 (Ind. Tax. 1997).
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comprehensive, annotated looseleaf deskbook.
• Principles of Agricultural Law, a comprehensive
annotated college textbook, by Roger A. McEowen and Neil
E. Harl.
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This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The book
contains over 900 pages and an index.
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offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
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